











In this article I aim to re-visit the contested concept of populism. I urge scholars to approach the 
study of this polymorphous ideology known as ‘Populism’ with an open mind. Today, it is no 
longer necessary to strictly separate the ideological characteristics of populism from its 
particularistic discursive and strategic elements. I propose that the populism of the left and the 
right share similarities that could possibly outweigh their differences. I first outline a set of 
misconceptions that have prevented us from realising that populism does in fact hold a 
redemptive side to it which can ultimately be positive to contemporary democracy. Second, I 
discuss the three main modern approaches to populism (ideational, socio-cultural, political-
strategic) and provide a brief but useful critique of all of them. Third, I present my very own 
‘fresh’ approach to the topic and provide an in-depth definition of populism in order to give 
“right-wing” and “left-wing” populism a better and fairer hearing, especially in an era where the 
discontents of world populations towards political elites are increasing. Finally, I share some 
thoughts on what the future direction of the study of such an intricate marvel like populism 
should entail, also addressing the question of whether in times likes these the left-right divide is 
still relevant.  
 
Some misconceptions 
A great number of scholars are still baffled by the term ‘populism’ (Tarchi 19-32) . The term 
recurs so often that hardly a day goes by without reading about populism in the press, where 
mainstream journalists use mostly as a derogatory word, or in the media, where a familiar 
politician launches a verbal tirade against a rival, accusing them of being ‘populist’.  
 
Before we attempt to define what populism is (or might be), it would be a good idea to focus our 
attention on what it is not. First, populism is not simply demagogy. While it certainly can take 
demagogic forms, especially in its more primitive versions, it is much more than rabble-rousing 
exhortations made by questionable characters to stir up frustrated crowds, the kind of entity an 
aristocratic and elitist thinker Plato would refer to as the “many-headed monster” (Canovan 96).   
 
Second, populism is not necessarily some sort of radical political statement. It is not exactly 
fascism, in the same way as it is most certainly not communism (Weyland 55-65). Most prefer to 
incidentally or purposely confuse it with the former. In reality, populism lacks the sophistication 
of full-fledged political ideologies such as palingenetic ultra-nationalism (also known as ‘fascism’) 
or Marxist post-Hegelianism (also known as ‘communism’), where both maintain an allegiance to 
their own specific myths and symbols as well as a coherent ideological repertoire (Eatwell et al.). 
Although populism does often advocate a far-fetched general reform of society, it certainly is not 
as revolutionary as fascism and communism (Dhanagare 22). More importantly, throughout 
history, the concept of populism has also been borrowed by the “radical centre” of Tony Blair, 








Third, it is intellectually dubious to state that the populist electorate comprises only of un-
educated angry and poor white men. In fact, recent studies have shown that more than half of 
white women have voted for Donald J. Trump in the last American presidential run (Jaffe 18-26). 
In their late work, Roger Eatwell (2016) and Matthew Goodwin (2016) destroy the myths and 
inaccurate narratives surrounding populists and their voters (Eatwell and Goodwin). With 
particular attention to ‘national-populists’ (or right-wing populists), the two British scholars 
explain that a significant amount of Trump’s support came from people who also had degrees 
and had stable and decent full-time job incomes (Ibid). Whilst it is true that large portions of 
populist voters globally are part of disengaged and economically lower strands of the population, 
the body also includes free-market libertarians and more conservative preservationists who are 
not necessarily economically deprived and do not overwhelmingly belong to a specific ethnic 
group (Ibid). 
 
Fourth, populism is not entirely incompatible with democracy (Canovan 2-16). Intellectuals of 
substantial relevance, such as Margaret Canovan (2005), Benjamin Moffitt (2020) and Chantal 
Mouffe (2018), have in distinct ways demonstrated to academia that whilst there have been 
degenerative authoritarian and sometimes even totalitarian populisms like the ones of Fidel 
Castro, Hugo Chavez and Juan Peron in Latin America, with their appeal to ‘the people’, 
populism as a more horizontal and direct democracy has also proved it can be somewhat of 
“fixer of democracy” (Moffit). This means that populism can remind elites that there also exist 
majoritarian and republican principles in the democratic process, often overlooked in the name 
of constitutionalism and liberalism (Ibid). Mudde sheds some light on this issue specifically, 
explaining how calls for popular sovereignty and participation can lead full-blown authoritarian 
systems to move into an increasingly democratic direction (Mudde and Kaltwasser). In this 
manner, populism can help create the circumstances for the development of an at least electoral-
democratic -if not liberal-democratic- system from a dictatorial regime. For instance, insurgent 
populistic nationalisms like those we have seen during the late 18th century in France and slightly 
earlier with the revolution across the Atlantic, or even in the recent 20th century struggles where 
Slavic independentist forces faced either their Soviet or Yugoslavian oppressors, have generally 
contributed to tearing down outdated tyrannical apparatuses.   
 
Finally, populism is definitely not a passing phase (Goodwin). It has been around since the 
beginning of time. Some political theorist have even suggested that it could have been practiced 
during the ‘glory days’ of Athens, and that Athenian democracy is an example of what could be 
defined as ‘populist democracy’ (Mair 81-98). Early modern conceptualisations of the 
phenomenon, at least in its strictly civic, participatory and anti-elitist derivatives, can also be 
traced back to the Rousseau and the city-state era (Canovan 48). That being said, the most 
coherent populist appeals have manifested themselves with the narodniks in Russia and the 
People’s Party in the United States (Taggart).  
 
Nowadays, populism re-appears as acutely welfarist, protectionist and anti-immigrationist. 
Populists, are globally either influencing policy-making directly, by being in power or sharing 
power with other non-populist actors. In Austria, the coalition involving both populists and 
liberal conservatives is a perfect example of the latter case. Moreover, in worst case scenarios 






occurs mainstream actors have difficulty ignoring them due to their growing popularity. Hence, 
they often find themselves having to give in to their demands (Forthomme). Additionally, non-
populists (or ‘anti-populists’ as we will see later) have to make use of populist people-centric politics 
too in order to maintain their parliamentary majorities. Sometimes, they even imitate populists by 
adopting what Jan Werner Muller rightly defines as populism-light (Müller). More specifically, 
Populist-oriented charismatic leadership is present in the U.S.A (e.g. Donald J. Trump), India 
(e.g. Narendra Modi), Hungary (e.g. Victor Orban) and maybe even in Britain and France, where 
both Boris Johnson and Emmanuel Macron have showcased some populist characteristics. 
 
Contemporary theoretical approaches to populism: Ideology, performative act or strategy? 
Despite the wide use of the term ‘populism’ there is no consensus on a definition of the 
phenomenon. This has been the case since the London School of Economic conference of 1967. 
Those who have dedicated years of scrutiny to populism, namely Donald MacRae, Peter Worsley, 
Edward Shils, Kenneth Minogue, Angus Stewart , each gave their own view on the matter but 
were interlocked in disagreement with others (Tarchi 19-85). The major disagreement concerns 
the core of phenomenon. Some consider it to be an ideology, others a discursive style or perhaps 
even a political technique, if not a , mentalité as Marco Tarchi and Pierre Andre Taguiff  call it 
(Ibid 32-52). However, it was Isaiah Berlin who during the conference made the point that 
academics involuntarily created a “Cinderella complex” around populism, attempting at all costs 
to find the right foot that could not easily fit the shoe (Tarchi 491-518). It could be that Berlin 
was using a metaphor to merely tell us that the essence of populism does in fact exist somewhere, 
and that it had to be found sooner or later (Tarchi 25).  
 
Today, the three main approaches (ideational, socio-cultural, political-strategic) to populism have 
also, to some degree, failed us. Cas Mudde who developed the very interesting theory that 
populism is a thin-centred ideology (unlike the other ‘thick’ ideologies we have seen from the 18th 
century onwards) that considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde). Mudde, who is the 
pioneer of the ideational approach, however falls short because he over-relies on abstract 
ideological models which can involuntarily lead to generalisations and incoherent assumptions. 
This critique is especially pertinent when it comes to labelling as ‘populist’ those leaders, parties 
and movements that are not populist but have perhaps merely used populist rhetoric and 
antagonistic discursive styles (of which I will go into detail in the next paragraphs). For example, 
it would be difficult to apply the definition to classic liberals like Berlusconi who have openly 
praised the European Union and disavowed any form of right-wing populistic sovereignism 
(Moffit). This is especially true when considering the ‘later years’ Berlusconi. Likewise, asserting 
that neofascists like Jean Marie Le Pen - who has been flirting with outright holocaust denial 
throughout her whole political career - can be populist, is an error (Weyland 62-63). Sometimes 
fascists, conservatives, liberals and even socialists can appear to be populist when they use 
populist techniques (Paxton 52-118). Another politician, who is often erroneously labelled as 
populist is the mainstream conservative and republican George W. Bush, who lost the popular 
vote in the American elections and appears too close to elitist neoliberal positions to be a real 
populist (Weyland 53). As Kurt Weyland argues, ideational theory alone is insufficient to 
understand populism, because it attributes disproportionate importance to the “us vs them” 






where they belong on the spectrum and whether they are mainstream or not (Ibid). However, it is 
true that populists appeal directly to “the people” in a less mediated fashion than other actors 
(Canovan 81-98).  
 
Another notable and relevant modern approach to populism has been developed by French 
scholar Pierre Ostiguy (Ostiguy 73-93). The socio-cultural approach focuses on discourse and style, 
essentially treating populism as a performative act. According to this approach, populists are put 
under scrutiny by two correlated criterions: a directly socio-cultural one and a political-cultural one 
(Ibid 79). In the first one, Ostiguy argues that populists “flaunt the low” (Ibid 73). By this he 
means that we should envision an orthogonal axis to the left and right one on the political 
spectrum which in turn holds two opposites: ‘high’ and ‘low’. On the ‘high’, we find all the non-
populists or (‘anti-populist’) like Francois Hollande, Mario Monti, David Cameron and many 
others who are extremely procedural, bureaucratic and formal when applying themselves in the 
political arena (Ibid 79). These politicians can appear bookish, elitist, and detached from the 
ordinary man in the street (Ibid 78-84).  
 
The language of these establishment reflects that: the well-presented ‘suit-and-tie politicians’ who 
is sophisticated and very different to the populists on the “low” end (Ibid).  Famous populists 
like Umberto Bossi, Beppe Grillo and the recent Donald J. Trump -although distinct from each 
other politico-ideologically- do have something in common: they use direct and unmediated 
language. All three of them ‘flaunt the low’. Politicians belonging to the centre would never 
dream of using language like for example, Bossi who taunts his opponents directly with personal 
insults, or Trump does, or even call for unconstitutional measures, something that Grillo still 
does. This last one, once notably claimed he would make sure to “open up Parliament like a can 
of tuna” (Movarelli 213-221). Populists on the ‘low’ are often unfiltered, and direct to the point 
of being vulgar. They can sometimes appear clumsy and unkempt compared to their anti-populist 
rivals. They rarely wear suits and do not contrive to appear as polite and procedural. On the 
contrary, they ‘flaunt the low’ using folksy expressions and vernacular to directly appeal to fixed 
geographical areas and peoples with even more fixed interests (as in Bossi’s case with his 
secessionist Northern League) (Ostiguy et al. 80).  
 
Although Ostiguy’s approach has merit, we should be careful of its limitations as it is an 
ideational one. ‘High and low’ are too easily confused with ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ (Ostiguy). For 
example, the Dutch Pim Fortuyn and Austrian Jorg Haider are often labelled as populist while 
they were both significantly educated, well-mannered and extremely careful in their use of 
language even when making controversial statements against minorities. Haider, always appeared 
neat and tidy, wore tailored suits and drove expensive fast cars (Zehndorfer). He was well-
educated and did not consistently ‘flaunt the low’. For this reason, the good aesthetics and upper 
middle class eccentrism belonging to some populist characters are hard to legitimise as having a 
place in the ‘low’. 
 
Kurt Weyland, the advocate of the political-strategic approach suggests that academics have spent 
too much time focusing on what populists say, failing to study what they do when in power and 
opposition (Weyland 50). Weyland was right when he proposed that unlike fascists and 
communists, populists are not very ideological, and are generally less concerned about ideology 






adopted as a strategy just to appeal to as many people as possible, in other words, a political 
strategy to obtain full powers in the shortest time possible (Ibid). However, this argument can 
raise some eyebrows. Weyland almost entirely refutes ideology, when in fact most populists do 
have ideological tropes in common (to be listed below). Primarily, they all share an anti-elitist ethos. 
It is true that some populists are more ideological than others, for example, Italian populist 
Matteo Salvini is more loyal to his commitments to regionalism, productivism and free-market 
conservatism, while Grillo flexibly oscillates between left libertarianism and environmentalist 
socialism (Tronconi 76). Another limitation would be thatthe political-strategic approach comes 
close to the ideational one, which attributes far too much relevance to the element of charisma, 
when in fact not all populist parties consistently rely on charismatic leadership (e.g. Alternative 
fur Deutschland, Sweden Democrats and Flemish Bloc). Further, the political-strategic approach 
overestimates the top-down personalism in populism. Not all populist parties or protest-
movements exercise personalism or have a definite top-down hierarchical structure (Meade). 
Some populist mobilisations, like the substantially left-leaning Occupy Wall Street, have shown to 
be rather horizontal and bottom-up (Ibid). The same can be said of the much older narodniks in 
Russia. Finally, Weyland’s claim that all parties/movements that are truly populist will dismantle 
or stay in opposition forever unless they have a rapid ascent to power soon after their genesis can 
also be easily dismissed. This is due to the fact that there are countless examples of populist 
parties that have come in and out of power, without ever disintegrating and falling into political 
oblivion (Ostiguy 90-91). The Italian Northern League (now only called ‘League’), the French 
Front National (now called ‘National Rally), the Austrian Freedom Party and the Sweden 
Democrats have all been around for quite some time and continue to influence policy decisions 
regardless of whether they are represented in government alone, in a coalition, or in opposition 
(d’Albergo 48). They also do not seem to be going anywhere (Goodwin).  
 
All things considered, the three modern approaches to populism have been extremely helpful in 
developing theoretical frameworks and stimulating empirical analysis (e.g. Kirk Hawkins’s 
populist ‘fuzzy-sets’) and ought not to be ignored, but just re-evaluated objectively and evolved, 
especially as populism has soared since the 2014 European Elections, and for the first time in 
history a coalition of left-wing and right-wing populists was experimented upon in the Italian 
sphere (‘Contratto di governo’ between Five Star Movement and League) (Moschella 1-14). A new 
approach is needed now more than ever.  
 
A fresh start: an all-encompassing approach 
While previous attempts to define populism seem to have failed to pin-point its precise nature, 
they allow us to say to produce a composite defintion which reads as follows:“populism is a 
polymorphous and versatile ideology that heavily relies on antagonistic discourse as well as a set of particularistic 
political strategies to send its message across to its perennial opponents and potential supporters”.  
I did not choose this wording at random. Populism is polymorphous because it does not have a well 
defined ideological structure but can rather mutate and change colour like a chameleon according 
to what politically suits it best (Lee 355-378). Populism has taken different shapes and forms 
throughout history, and this had depended on both temporal and national contexts. When the 
Keynesian state was showing its weaknesses towards the end of the 20th century, populist-driven 
charismatic leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan advocated for large scale 
deregulation of the economy and a global free market for both corporations and individuals to 






(Tarchi). What Thatcher, Reagan and Berlusconi had in common was their appeal to popular 
sovereignty. Thatcher even coined the word “popular capitalism” (Constitutional Right 
Foundation 12). Many years down the line, but also inconsistently during that time, the versatile 
nature of populism has been seen not only on the economic level but also on the cultural one. 
After the recession of 2008, worldwide parties and movements began branding themselves as 
anti-globalist and opposing not only the free market but the free movement of people (De Diego 
and Caulkin). Populist parties in particular, made very specific appeals to ‘the people’, ‘freedom’ 
and the nation-state. Hardly anyone will find overtly free-market populists after the economic 
crisis. Right-wing populist like Salvini, Le Pen and Trump are largely protectionist (at least in 
theory) and left-wing ones, like Di Maio, Tsipiras and others, are also economically anti-globalist, 
and nearly always oppose open borders and freedom of movement.  
 
Another example of polymorphism to be found in populism is that it can be urban, but in the 
past has also been rural-agrarian, and it can be liberal, but it can also be illiberal (in both socio-
cultural and economic terms). Lest we forget, it can be left- or right- wing, depending on its ‘host 
ideology’, as Mudde notes. Again, it can be open to compromise with mainstream actors like in 
the case of the Five Star Movement and the Austrian Freedom Party, but it can also be 
uncompromising and stubborn like ‘Peronismo’ and ‘Chavismo’ (Mudde). Experts distinguish 
between the ‘national populism’ of the right, the ‘neoliberal populism’ and ‘tele-populism’ that 
can be found on centre-left and centre-right, and the ‘revolutionary populism’ of the hard-left 
(Germani 56-57). The Five Star Movement is moderately left-leaning, but it has also been 
sometimes referred to as ‘techno-populist’, and therefore almost impossible to locate anywhere 
on the political spectrum as we know it (Trottier 76).  
 
What is clear,, however is that all populists use, or have at some point used, antagonistic discourse 
that can be extremely helpful in identifying perennial opponents when there is a mood of politician 
distrust and de-alignment as well as economic deprivation and the electorate’s perceived 
destruction caused by swift ethnic change1. For example, a right populist like Salvini openly called 
the European Union’s single currency a “a crime against mankind”, but went on to partially win 
the Italian 2018 elections. A few years ago Grillo suggested that it would be great if Islamist 
 
 
1 Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M., 2018. National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. Pelican. 
(Please note: In their work Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin indicate that the fear of seemingly rapid but     
actually gradual ethnic change that exists among mainly white European middle and working class electorates is a 
major factor that has contributed to the rise of political national-populism. Statistics made available by official 
European Union documents online at ec.europa.eu might suggest that some of these fears are legitimate given that 
illegal immigration flows into the continent have been steadily increasing in the 2015-2016 period. In regard to legal 
immigration, 2.4 million documented migrants have made their way into the EU-27 area in 2018. Statistics related to 
illegal immigration for more recent times are not easily available and harder to access. However, it is a fact that 21.8 
million non-EU citizens have made Europe their home by January 2019. The respected Pew Research Center has 
demonstrated that the levels of unauthorised immigration have risen to dramatic levels only in 2016 where it peaked 
at 5.3 million and then “levelled-off”. That being said, ethnic change is a matter of how it is perceived by electorates 
rather than the actual numerical data. It appears that a good portion of a minority of voters in any given European 
member state believe that immigration alters the cultural, ethnic and social identity of a nation and that their only 







terrorists had “the right coordinates to drop a bomb on Parliament (Di Giuseppe).” Ironically, 
his “hybrid-party” currently holds the largest number of MP’s in the two Italian parliamentary 
chambers. These are just two examples of the antagonistic discourse strategy and many more can be 
found by carrying out a discursive analysis of Le Pen’s, Trump’s and Salvini’s speeches or tweets.  
We could therefore suggest that while the ideological structure of populism is not exactly well 
defined but six tropes can be identified that recur quite often, regardless of whether the populist 
party is considered to belong to the right or left. Those six tropes are in scattered order: anti-
elitism (always present), anti-globalism (predominantly present in the form of ‘Euroscepticism’) ,“un-
politics” (what Paul Taggart implies is a rejection of professional politics slightly distinct from 
outright ‘anti-politics’), sovereignism (defence of popular, territorial and parliamentary sovereignty), 
producerism (similar to ‘productivism’ a positive emphasis on those in society who produce and 
belong to the “pure people”), and reformism (supporting radical change but not systemic 
revolutions).  
 
Moving forward, the perennial opponents of populists of left and right remain essentially the same, 
even if they might articulate their offensives against these opponents slightly differently, 
depending on where they reside within the spectrum. It is widely accepted that populists who are 
more left-leaning are motivated by anti-elitism when attacking ‘corporate elites’ because of their 
wealth and authoritative character (Taggart). Instead, their right-leaning ‘cousins’ prefer to focus 
their attacks on the elites belonging to transnational institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, European Commission and lately even World Health 
Organisation, not merely due to their great wealth but due to their opaque influence on political 
decisions. The latter are less concerned about the fact that independent institutions often carry 
out their own private monetary interests in a potentially corrupt manner, but they are more 
worried that those institutions are overrepresented and led by culturally ‘liberal elites’ (Ibid). 
Liberal elites are apologists of immigration and the degradation of traditional societal norms and 
therefore anathema to right-wing populists. In times of profound perceived economic and moral 
crisis, by using rewarding strategies such as the call for people-centric politics (rallies and referendums), 
personalisation through media, victimisation, and of course, antagonistic discourse any one can become a 
potential supporter of a populist force. In terms, of social class, we have already established,- in line 
with the great recommendation of Matthew Goodwin and Roger Eatwell (REF),that electorates 
with significantly different backgrounds and identities can be drawn at once to the populist web 
(Eatwell and Goodwin). The only way to understand populism and perhaps one day discover its 
true essence (supposing that there is one) is to properly is to encompass the ideological, 
performative, discursive and political-strategic elements in one larger approach that integrates the 
several distinctive and divisive elements of its forma mentis. 
The future direction 
 
My research explores the conditions that have allowed a left-right populist coalition to form in 
Italy in during June 2018 out. My aim will be to show that the Five Star Movement and League 
share a common ideological patrimony loosely based upon the six tropes I have discussed above. 
and have also opportunistically relied on the same opportunistic political strategies that were 
mentioned in sections above. Moreover, I wish to examine the nature of the relationship that has 
held populist of left and right together. Of course, this involves a commentary on how both 
populist formations have responded to external and internal current demand-side issues,  such as 






mainstream politics in the other, in conjunction with their overall view of democracy. ‘Populist 
democracy’ is the conceptualisation of a system where there is an overwhelmingly vertical access 
of ordinary people to institutions, a system that is disproportionately unmediated and 
majoritarian (Mair 81-98). This idea has also been been linked to ‘direct democracy’, theoretically 
incompatible with representative democracy (Del Savio). Whether populists really believe in 
direct democracy itself or believe that they can achieve it is still unknown, but what is certain so 
far, is that the anti-elitist or “anti-establishment ethos” that Lorenzo Cini has aptly described does 
play a central role in the constitution of a “lethal political cocktail” between populist left and right 
(Cini).  
 
A few examples of what I have found out so far when familiarising myself with Matteo Salvini’s 
and Luigi Di Maio’s parties in Italy is that these two populist parties hold a series of similarities 
and differences (Moschella 1-14). Setting aside for a moment that the coalition government 
between Five Star Movement and League failed due to Salvini-led party’s voluntary and strategic 
withdrawal, it appears that the ideological similarities outweigh the differences between the two. 
If the League’s “captain” Salvini had not suddenly suffered from some form of ‘Napoleon’s 
complex’ (attributing his withdrawal to his coalition-partners’ obstructionism on set policy) and 
instead chosen to remain in the coalition (rather than incorrectly assuming that he could rule 
alone,  it would have been likely that the coalition would have kept going until the natural end of 
the legislation.  In summary, during the short-lived Italian populist coalition we saw how two 
parties on apparently opposite sides of the spectrum can build a partnership and a coherent 
agenda based on six tropes, especially anti-elitist ethos. Anti-elitism has permitted the two parties to 
govern together for more than a year and agree on policies such as the drastic reduction of the 
costs of politics, the ‘cutting down’ of parliamentarians, a number of pro-welfare policies, the re-
negotiation of EU treaties, and the securitizing of the immigration question (Politi). 
 
In the aftermath of Brexit, Trump and the populist ‘contract’ in Italy, we could be looking at 
more prospective populist governments. Hence, it would be reasonable to argue that academics 
should dedicate even more time to the understanding of the populist and (neo)populist (the 
populist parties and movements born in the last ten to twenty years) phenomenon. A sensible 
direction to move in would be that of addressing the gradual erosion of the left and right sharp 
divide in a time of large scale political de-alignment. The new cleavage seems to be less that 
between rightists and leftists, free-marketeers and Keynesians, but rather between populists and 
anti-populists. Benjamin Moffitt (2019) recognises that while populism has been put under 
scrutiny not enough time has been dedicated to understanding the anti-populism of those located 
on Ostiguy’s ‘high’ (Moffit). The re-focusing on the ideological character, discursive style and 
policies of personalities like Hillary Clinton, Matteo Renzi and Angela Merkel that have warned 
us against the dangers of populism, can be used to not merely understand anti-populism better 
but populism itself (Ibid). Moffitt also enlightens his readers by underlining that the politicians 
mentioned above have little in common with regards to fiscal and social policy, but nonetheless 
are all essentially centrist actors who agree that deliberation, representative and liberal are put 
under threat by the populist surge (Ibid). This surge evokes the return to an imaginary but still 
somehow vivid heartland (Taggart). In the populist mindset, it is likely that the sovereign and 
independent nation-state (the heartland) keeps politics at a minimum. Curiously though, the anti-
populist Macronian politics (relating to Emmanuel Macron) of “not left, nor right”, and, before 






comparable to the new populist third way attempted by the Five Star and League in Italy. After 
all, it was Salvini who refused to appropriate any “right-wing label”, and, like Le Pen in France, 
prefers to remind the public how he is “neither left nor right” but instead stands for a 
“revolution of common sense” (‘rivoluzione del buonsenso’) which corresponds to an electorate of 
“decent people” (la gente per bene)” (Passarelli and Tuorto 89-107). 
 
In other words, the divisions between right and left, and perhaps between populists of right and 
left, seem to be continuously blurred. While it is true that the host ideology of a populist 
formation does have an impact on its positions, it is also true that populists of right and left have 
been forming alliances not only at a national level but at a transnational one. For example, we 
have seen that in the European Parliament left-leaning pro-welfarist formations like the Five Star 
Movement have joined groups with anti-welfarist right-leaning formations like the UK 
Independence Party (Del Savio). The same point can be made about Salvini’s League and the Le 
Pen’s Front National, they essentially operate under the same banner in the European Parliament, 
but the first is still now sympathetic to regionalism and federalism while the second is ardently 
centralist and nationalist. Once again, it is their anti-elitist ethos that accompanies their anti-globalist 
and anti-immigrationist, majoritarian populist creed that holds them together in both cases. As years 
pass, and the populist zeitgeist continues, the real demarcation line is now between sovereignists 
and globalists (nationalist and internationalists), Europhiles and Eurosceptics, and/or ultimately 
anti-populists neoliberals and populists. This needs to be looked at it in more detail and is useful 
in any project that has the ambition of uncovering the nature of any relationship that involves 
populists of left and right.  
 
Rather ambitiously, I plan to incorporate all these aspects in a segment in my future work. I can 
only hope that academics worldwide will not dismiss the all-encompassing approach and focus their 
attention on incorporating the necessary empirical elements to carry out such investigations 
successfully, such as interviews with populist policy-makers as well as the in-depth analysis of 
electoral manifestos. Additionally, methodologies that include more participatory and interactive 
field work with subjects belonging to the electorate of populist parties can be useful. I can only 
hope that the academic world adopts what Lana Mosley calls “rigorous subjectivity” when dealing 
with these matters, given that any keen intellectual interest in the populist phenomenon also 
holds a moral responsibility, that of not giving way to the promotion of false narratives (Mosley). 
Alas! there cannot continue to be this separation or tension between liberalism (rule of law and 
individual liberty) from democracy (popular sovereignty and majoritarianism). So far, facilitated by 
mainstream media outlets, both populists and anti-populists have unfortunately propagated this 
incorrect and menacing binary. Perhaps, before attempting to stop populism, we should dedicate 
more time to its full comprehension. 
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Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. 1st ed., Oxford 
University  
Press, 2017. 
Mudde, Cas. "Populism Isn’T Dead. Here Are Five Things You Need To Know About It.". The 
Guardian, 2017. 






Ostiguy, Pierre. "Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach". The Oxford Handbook On Populism, 
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 1st ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
2017. 
Ostiguy, Pierre. "The High-Low Divide: Re-Thinking Populism And Anti-Populism". Committee 
On Concepts And Methods, IPSA, vol 35, 2009, p. Abstract.. 
Passarelli, Gianluca, and Dario Tuorto. La Lega Di Salvini: Estrema Destra Di Governo. Il Mulino, 
2018. 
Paxton, Robert O. The Anatomy Of Fascism. 1st ed., Penguin Books, 2004. 
Pellegrino, Barbara. "Matteo Salvini: The Making Of A Modern Despot?". Eyes On Europe, 2019. 
Politi, James, and Valentina Romei. "Five Star And League Agree Governing Contract For 
Italy". Financial Times, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/6c7a5446-5a76-11e8-bdb7-
f6677d2e1ce8. 
Taggart, Paul. "Conférence "Populism And Unpolitics" Animée Par P. Taggart". 2018. 
Taggart, Paul. "Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics". Democracies And The 
Populist Challenge, Yves Mény and Yves Surel, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp.62-80. 
Taggart, Paul. Populism. Vivabooks, 2002. 
Tarchi, Marco. "Intervista Al Prof. Marco Tarchi Sul Leader Di "Forza Italia": Berlusconi E' Su 
Una Brutta China". Redazione Consul Press, Roma, Italia, 2014. 
Tarchi, M., 2015. Italia Populista: Dal Qualinquismo A Beppe Grillo. 2nd ed. Il Mulino. 
Tarchi, Marco. "Prince And A Shoe: Where Is The Princess? The “Cinderella Complex” In 
Political Science, Fifty Years Later". Studia Politica, vol 17, no. 4, 2017, 491-516. 
Tronconi, Filippo. Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement : Organisation, Communication And Ideology. 
Routledge, 2016. 
Trottier, Daniel, and Christian Fuchs. Social Media, Politics And The State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, 
Crime And Policing In The Age Of Facebook, Twitter And Youtube. 1st ed., Routledge, 2014. 
Weyland, Kurt. "Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach". The Oxford Handbook On Populism, 
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 1st ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
2017. 
Zehndorfer, Elesa. Charismatic Leadership: The Role Of Charisma In The Global Financial Crisis. Taylor 
And Francis Ltd., 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
